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Abstract
Risk is one of inherent problems in all software systems. It becomes more
significant if the software system is operated in a critical system (e.g., air traffic
control, nuclear plant). It is because in this domain the software system is expected
to be always dependable all the time of its operation. The system is dependable
when all its risks are suppressed until acceptable level. Therefore, in such setting
analysts must carefully analyze the socio-technical system (i.e., organizational-
setting and software systems) and understand how uncertain events may affect the
systems. By means of the Tropos Goal-Risk, we model the socio-technical system
including its risks. Essentially, the framework consists of goal, event, and treat-
ment modeling. The goal layer represents what the stakeholders’ interests are and
how to achieve them. The event layer depicts how uncertain events occur and im-
pact the goals of stakeholders. The treatment layer represents what the possible
measures that are available to treat the events. By quantifying the evidence value
of the model, analysts can reason about the level of risk and choose the most appro-
priate alternative to achieve the stakeholders’ interests and the necessary treatment
that should be employed to mitigate the risks. We use a case study on Air Traffic
Management to illustrate the proposal.
1 Introduction
Software systems are more and more part of our daily life, and very often they have a
strong influence in our daily life decisions. In this setting, a software system plays a
critical roles. In literature [36], one distinguishes a critical system into: safety-critical
system (its failure may result in the loss of life or the environment damage direct or
indirectly), mission-critical system (its failure may cause to the failure of any activi-
ties that are means to achieve the organization goals), and business-critical system (its
failure may result to the high economic losses).
In such scenario, a model plays a main role to communicate the stakeholders’ mind
and modelers/analysts about the stakeholders’ interests. It is important because stake-
holders are the ones that really understand how the organization operates and acquire
full knowledge about the domain application of the software system. However, stake-
holders, typically, lack of technical expertises to realize the software system. Thus,
they need developers (i.e., analysts, designers, programmers) to realize their system.
In fact, many software systems fail to operate as their intended purposes because of
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mis-understanding between stakeholders and developers (especially analysts) [43]. It
happens, mainly, during a requirement modeling phase when the strategic-interests of
stakeholders are identified. Ideally, a model should have a precise semantic definition
for each construct. So that, each actor, which is involved in the modeling process,
has the same interpretation for the same model of the system. By means of a con-
ceptual model, analysts may verify their understanding about the existing system or
the stakeholders’ intentions. All of these will reduce the likelihood of having false or
unnecessary requirements.
In requirement engineering community, Goal-oriented RE methodologies and frame-
works (e.g., KAOS [10], i* [44], GBRAM [1], and Tropos [6]) emerge as a research
area where the concept of goal is used to facilitate analysts understanding the strategic-
interests of stakeholders and then motivates the system requirements within the orga-
nizational setting. Particularly, Tropos, which uses the i* as modeling framework, pro-
poses an early requirements analysis phase. During this phase, analysts learn about the
problems by studying the organizational-setting where the system will operate. This
phase results an organizational model which consists of relevant stakeholders or ac-
tors, their goals, and their interdependencies (i.e., who depend on one another for goals
to be fulfilled, tasks to be performed, and resources to be furnished). Through these
dependencies, one can answer why questions, besides what and how, regarding sys-
tem functionalities or requirements. Answers to why questions, ultimately, link system
functionalities to stakeholders’ interests, preferences, and intentions.
Though there are several attempts [25, 17] to enrich the Tropos/i* modeling frame-
work to model a critical software systems. However, we still found them inadequate
in depicting how a failure is developed or an attack occurs. This understanding about
failures or attacks is necessary to analyze alternative requirements and, if it is neces-
sary, to introduce additional mechanisms to mitigate the risks. In this work, we uses
Tropos Goal-Risk (GR) framework [3] to fill this gap by modeling them (i.e., attacks,
failures) as the event layer of the Tropos GR framework. We will explain, in detail,
the meta-model of the event layer, such that it is able to model failures and attacks
naturally. Based on this model, ones may elicit necessary countermeasures to mitigate
the risks which are introduced by the event layer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We briefly explain about Air Traffic
Management (§2) which is used to explain how to model the current situation using a
Risk-Countermeasure framework, namely Tropos Goal-Risk framework (§3) and later
analyzed it. Essentially, Tropos GR framework consists in three layers: goal, event,
and treatment layers. The goal layer represents what the stakeholders’ interests are and
how to achieve them. The event layer depicts how uncertain events occur and impact
the goals of stakeholders. The treatment layer represents what possible measures are
available to treat the events. Our contribution, mainly, is in proposing a quantitative
model of the Tropos GR framework which based on the Dempster-Shafer theory of
evidence [34]. Later, we present the related work for our proposal (§4). Finally, we
conclude the paper with a final discussion and future works (§5).
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Figure 1: Profile of a Commercial Flight
2 Scenario
Essentially, Air Traffic Management (ATM) [22] is categorized as a critical socio-
technical systems because its operations highly involves human interaction, and its
failures may result human-life losses. Thereby, it is required to be dependable dur-
ing all its operation. Based on [15], ATM is an aggregation of services that consists
of Airspace Organization and Management (AO&M), Air Traffic Flow and Capacity
Management (ATCFM), Air Traffic Control (ATC), Airport operations, Aircraft oper-
ations, and Information management. In this section, we briefly explain ATC system
which is mainly responsible to maintain a safe, orderly, and efficient flow of traffic.
This service is provided by ground-based Air Traffic Controllers (ATCOs) to maintain
safe operation of aircraft and any related third parties (e.g., ground-crews, airports).
Such as, ATCOs should control aircraft to maintain horizontal and vertical separation
among aircraft in their airspace. Moreover, they must ensure traffic flows orderly and
provide flight context information to pilots (e.g., routes, weather conditions, etc.).
These services are organized by an authorized body depending on the phase of a
flight (e.g., pre-flight, take-off, departure, en-route, descent, approach, landing). Dur-
ing pre-flight and take-off phases, ATC services are provided by ATCOs operating
at the departure airport. In case for approach and landing phases, an aircraft is con-
trolled by ATCO’s which operates in the tower on arrival airport. Climb, en-route, and
approach phases are managed by ATCOs operating in the various Air-traffic Control
Centers (ACCs) where the aircraft passes through. All operations of ATCOs are defined
in very elaborate procedures driven by imperative safety requirements and regulated by
air navigation authorities (e.g., EUROCONTROL, FAA, ICAO).
Several accidents, such as: aircraft collision, controlled flight into terrain, and wake
turbulence, are still becoming main concerns of many air navigation authorities. Based
on [14], aircraft collision can be distinguished into three classes: mid-air collision
(while an aircraft is airborne), runway collision (while an aircraft in runway), and taxi-
way collision (while an aircraft in taxiway). Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) is an
accident in which aircraft, under the control of the crew, is flown into terrain (or water,
obstacle) with no prior awareness on the part of the crew of the impending accident.
Wake turbulence is an accident in which an aircraft gets severe effect of the rotating air
masses generated behind the wing tips of a large jet aircraft. In this paper, we present
the use of a conceptual model, Tropos Goal-Risk in particular, to model how such acci-
dents are occurred and impact the business goal of ATC services using the data [14, 37]
from EUROCONTROL.
3
3 Tropos Goal-Risk Framework
Tropos is a software development methodology that adopts the concept of agent and its
related mentalistic notions (e.g., goals, tasks, and resources) along all the phases of de-
velopment process [6]. The methodology spans from early requirements analysis up to
implementation. It uses goal models to represents agent (or more general actor) mental
states [19]. The key role of early requirements analysis is to model the stakeholders’
strategic-interests and the system-to-be, together with the organizational-setting where
the system will operate.
This modeling framework seems to be inadequate to model such a critical system
where the failure of a system causes severely consequences to the stakeholders (even to
the environment). Therefore, Goal-Risk (GR) framework [3] is introduced extending
the Tropos goal model [18, 33] by introducing constructs and relations specific for
analyzing risk. So it can model any circumstances that cause failures and deals with
them. By means of this framework, an analyst may analyze the system model, in terms
of its risks and possibly introduces any countermeasures to mitigate unacceptable risks.
In this paper, we propose a quantitative model for Tropos GR model. Thus, it
facilitate analysts to model and reason about risk of the stakeholders’ interests using
quantitative data. This quantitative model is developed based on the Dempster-Shafer
theory of evidence [34]. This theory allows us to operate using subjective data, besides
only the objective one. Moreover, the Tropos GR model promotes a better understand-
ing about:
• what the interests (i.e., desires, intentions) of the stakeholders are;
• what the risks of the interests are, and how they are developed/occurred;
By this understanding, analysts may assess the risk of the stakeholders’ interests (and
consequently the system-to-be) and reacts accordingly (e.g., introducing any counter-
measures, eliminating such requirements). From now on, the term actor and stake-
holder are used interchangeable throughout this paper.
Essentially, a Goal-Risk (GR) model is represented as a graph 〈N ,R, I〉, where
N are nodes andR are relations (see Fig. 2). N is comprised of goals, tasks, resources,
and events. These nodes are interrelated among them with any relations in R which
are detailed in the modeling subsections. Goal (depicted as oval) is a strategic-interest
that an actor intends to achieve. Task (depicted as hexagon) are a sequence of actions
used to achieve a goal or to treat an event. Resource (depicted as rectangle) represents
a physical or an information entity which can be means to fulfill a goal or needed
to execute a task. Event (depicted as pentagon) is uncertain circumstance which is,
typically, out of the control of actor that can have an impact (positively or negatively)
on the fulfillment of a goal.
Generally, those nodes have two attributes SAT and DEN. These attribute represent
the evidence value of a node to be satisfied (i.e., goal to be fulfilled, task to be executed,
resource to be furnished, and event to be occurred) and denied respectively. In the
probability theory, if Prob(A) = 0.1 than we can infer that the probability of ¬A is
0.9 (i.e., P (¬A) = 1 − P (A)). Conversely, following the idea of Dempster-Shafer
theory [34] the evidence of the goal1 being denied (DEN) can not be inferred from the
1it is also applied for task, resource, and event
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Figure 2: Simple Model of Goal-Risk Framework
satisfaction evidence (SAT) and vice versa. Those attributes must fulfill the following
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rules:
0 ≤ Sat(Ni), Den(Ni) ≤ 1 (1)
Sat(Ni) +Den(Ni) +X(Ni) = 1 (2)
(1) states that SAT and DEN are positive values which are laid between [0 . . . 1], and (2)
rules that the total of evidence value of Ni must be equal 1. X(Ni) represents the lack
of evidence value for deciding the satisfaction or denial of Ni (i.e., ignorance [41]).
SAT, somehow, can be seen as the belief-degree [26] of the satisfaction of a node,
and conversely for DEN. Later, we will present how to obtain a probability value (i.e.,
subjective probability) from evidence values.
As mentioned before, the GR model is composed into three layers conceptual anal-
ysis: goal layer, event layer, and treatment layer. Goal layer analyzes stakeholders’
goals in a organization-setting. It also depicts how the stakeholders achieve their goals
by means of tasks and resources. For the sake simplicity (i.e., avoiding dependency
relationships), the GR model, presented in this paper, assumes all strategic-interests
belong to a single actor (called ATC provider). Event layer captures all significant un-
certain events that may effect the goal layer (mainly the one with negative effect). Risk
is defined as the combination of the probability an event and its consequences [23],
while in [9] risk is an uncertain events with negative impact which can prevent value
creation or erode existing value. Based on the latter definition, the event layer may also
capture an event with positive impact (called an opportunity) or, even, the one with
both polarities of impact. This feature is useful when the stakeholders start to decide
how far they need to suppress the risk with considering the possibility of losing some
opportunities. Treatment layer represents a set of possible measures that can be intro-
duced to treat the risk of the system. A treatment, in principle, is a special tasks which
is operated by reducing the likelihood or reducing the severity of an event. The details
of each layer are explained in the following subsections using the ATM scenario.
By means of a GR model, analysts can assess the risk of the system with following
the analysis process defined in [3]. The process requires the evidence values of ter-
minal nodes2 in 〈N ,R, I〉 and, later, the process propagates those values calculating
the evidence values of the stakeholders’ goals either to be satisfied or to be denied.
Analysts may specify certain criteria (e.g., maximum risk level, maximum total costs)
to evaluate alternative solutions. In this setting, the process will enumerate all possible
alternative solutions, which satisfy given criteria, to achieve stakeholders’ goals. More-
over, the event layer depicts how risks are developed (i.e., from terminal-events until
top-events) and, finally, impact stakeholders’ goals. In [2], we have defined guidelines
to define countermeasures which are categorized into 5 types (e.g., avoidance, preven-
tion, detection, alleviation, and retention) based on the structure of the event layer.
3.1 Goal Modeling
GR modeling starts from modeling the goal layer. It models strategic-interests of the
stakeholders and how they are fulfilled. Initially, 1) analysts collect the information
to identify the stakeholders’ strategic-interests. In the ATM scenario (in Fig. 3), an
2Vertex that has the evidence values initially. Typically, it does not have any incoming edges
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Figure 3: Goal Layer of ATM Scenario
ATC provider primarily aims to maintain aircraft safety (G1) and order air traffic
flow (G2) efficiently (called top-level goals). 2) Top-level goals must be decomposed
using AND/OR-decomposition until all leaf-goals are tangible (i.e., there is an actor that
can fulfilled the goals). For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the ATC provider can
fulfill its goals without any dependency to other actors. 3) Performs means-end analysis
to identify tasks or resources that are means to achieve leaf-goals, and 4) relates among
goals, tasks, or resource, if their satisfaction/denial affect the others using contribution
relations.
As depicted in Fig. 3, Goal G1 is refined (AND-decomposition) into several sub-
goals: maintain safety on the ground (G3), maintain safety during flight (G4),
and monitor airspace situation (G5). These subgoals must be fulfilled in order to
achieve the up-level goal (e.g., G1 ). Therefore, in terms of the evidence value of up-
level goal are calculated using (3)-(5) which are the adaptation from Yager’s ruls [42].
Suppose that Gi and Gj are AND-subgoals of Gup . Because the up-level goal is
fulfilled when both subgoals are fulfilled3, (3) specifies that the SAT of up-level goal is
calculated on the basis of the production of all the SAT of its subgoals. Conversely, the
3The framework has not consider the order of the fulfillment of all subgoals yet
7
DEN of up-level goal is defined in (4) because the up-level goal is failed when there is,
at least, one subgoal is failed . The up-level goal is undecidable if there is, at least, an
undecidable subgoal and no subgoal is failed, therefore the X(Gup) is defined in (5);
Sat(Gup) = Sat(Gi)× Sat(Gj) (3)
Den(Gup) = Den(Gi)× Sat(Gj) +Den(Gi)×Den(Gj) +
Den(Gi)×X(Gj) +
Sat(Gi)×Den(Gj) +X(Gi)×Den(Gi) (4)
X(Gup) = Sat(Gi)×X(Gj) +X(Gi)× Sat(Gj) +
X(Gi)×X(Gj) (5)
Moreover, a goal may have several alternatives of its fulfillment (i.e., OR-decomposition).
For instance, the goal of define Flight Plan (FP) (G9) can be done either by use pre-
defined FP assignment (G16) where FPs is assigned for particular routes statically,
or use ad-hoc FP assignment (G17) where each flight requests its FP before de-
parture. The fulfillment of either G16 or G17 can be counted as the fulfillment G9
. Adopting from the disjunctive consensus rule proposed by Dubois and Prade in [13],
we define how to calculate the evidence values of the up-level goal from its subgoals
as (6)-(8).
Sat(Gup) = Sat(Gi)× Sat(Gj) + Sat(Gi)×Den(Gj) +
Sat(Gi)×X(Gj) +
Den(Gi)× Sat(Gj) +X(Gi)× Sat(Gi) (6)
Den(Gup) = Den(Gi)×Den(Gj) (7)
X(Gup) = Den(Gi)×X(Gj) +X(Gi)×Den(Gj) +
X(Gi)×X(Gj) (8)
Actually, (6)-(8) mirror the ones from AND-decomposition. It is because the SAT ev-
idence is the summation of any situations where, at least, a subgoal is satisfied, and
the DEN evidence is calculated when all subgoals are denied. Moreover, both set-of-
formalizations (i.e., (3)-(5) and (6)-(8)) satisfy the basic rules (1)(2). An analyst must
ensure the evidence from all subgoals are disjoint, otherwise the same evidence are
calculate twice.
Tasks and resources are introduced as means to achieve leaf-goals in the model.
This analysis is depicted using a means-end relation. In Fig. 3, the goal coordinate
with adjacent ATC authorities (G8) is fulfilled by executing the task coordinate with
adjacent sectors (T5), and the provision of air space display (R1) allows the ATC
authority to achieve the goal monitor respectable instructions (G11). A means-end
relations may also use to represent which resources are needed for task executions, like
Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network (AFTN) (R3) or phone commu-
nication (R4) can be used as a mean to coordinate with adjacent sectors (T5). In
another context, a means-end relation can model the provision of a resource by a task.
For instance, flight data processing (T13) provides flight progress strips (R5) that,
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furtherly, is used for control flight following flight plan (G10). Suppose Ni is a
mean for Nj (Ni 7−→ Nj), then the evidence value of Nj follows with the one in Ni
following:
Sat(Nj) = Sat(Ni) (9)
Den(Nj) = Den(Ni) (10)
X(Nj) = X(Ni) (11)
Later, tasks and resources might be analyzed using decomposition relations with the
similar principles with the ones for goal-decomposition.
Moreover, the satisfaction/denial of goals, tasks, or resources can effect the other
constructs in the model. To capture this situation, the GR framework introduces contri-
bution relations which are adapted from probabilistic causation [31] in the philosophy
community. For instance, defining flight plans in ad-hoc ( G17 ) will create difficulty
in identifying a resolution action ( T8 ) in case there is a deviation between a flight and
its flight plan, but the denial of G17 does not effect either SAT or DEN of T8 . This
setting is modeled as G17
−0.01S7−→ T8. It infers the satisfaction of G17 will increase the
opposite evidence (DEN) of T8 until 0.01. Essentially, the GR framework distinguishes
contribution relations into 4 types: positive-satisfaction (+wS), positive-denial (+wD),
negative-satisfaction (-wS), and negative-denial (-wD), where w represents the extent
([0 . . . 1]) of the effect of source-node to the target-node. “+wS” (“+wD”) is used when
the satisfaction (denial) of source-node will increase the satisfaction (denial) evidence
of the target-node. Conversely, “-wS” (“-wD”) models that the satisfaction (denial)
of source-node will increase the denial (satisfaction) evidence of the target-node. The
relation like Ni
+w7−→ Nj is only a shortcut to represent Ni +wS7−→ Nj and Ni +wD7−→ Nj .
The evidence value of a target-node, as results of contribution relations, is calculated
following (12)-(13).
qSat(Nj) =
⌈
Sat0(Nj) +
∑
i∈srcS
|+ wij | × Sat(Ni) +
∑
i∈srcD
|-wij | ×Den(Ni)
⌉
(12)
qDen(Nj) =
⌈
Den0(Nj) +
∑
i∈srcD
|+ wij | ×Den(Ni) +
∑
i∈srcS
|-wij | × Sat(Ni)
⌉
(13)
Essentially, (12) (or (13)) calculates the total SAT (or DEN) value of Nj , denoted
as qSat(Nj) (or qDen(Nj)), from all contribution relations to Nj . The calculation of
qSat(Nj) (12) is done on the basis of the summation: the initial SAT of Nj (Sat0(Nj)),
all satisfaction evidence delivered from all nodes (srcS) connected with positive-satisfaction
(+wS) contribution relations, and all denial evidence from all nodes (srcD) connected
with negative-denial (-wD) ones. The similar principle is also applied for the calcu-
lation of qDen(Nj) (13) Since qSat(Nj) and qDen(Nj) represent the evidence value of
a node from contribution relations, then their value must satisfy the rule (1) but no
need to fulfill the rule (2). Normalization methods (14)-(16) are introduced to obtain
SAT, DEN , and X of Nj . Essentially, Sat(Nj) and Den(Nj) is defined as the
value of qSat(Nj) or qDen(N) respectively, when their summation is at most 1. In the
other case (i.e., the summation is greater than 1), one may assume there is a conflict
of evidence because the same evidence is counted as satisfaction evidence and denial
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evidence. In this framework, the conflicted evidence is counted as X(Nj) because we
can decide either it is satisfaction or denial evidence (i.e., (qSat(Nj) + qDen(Nj) − 1)).
Consequently, Sat(Nj) is obtained by subtracting qSat(Nj) with the value of conflicted
evidence (X(Nj)).
Sat(N) =
{
qSat(N), if qSat(N) + qDen(N) ≤ 1;
1− qDen(N), otherwise.
(14)
Den(N) =
{
qDen(N), if qSat(N) + qDen(N) ≤ 1;
1− qSat(N), otherwise.
(15)
X(N) =
{
1− (qSat(N) + qDen(N)), if qSat(N) + qDen(N) ≤ 1;
(qSat(N) + qDen(N) − 1), otherwise.
(16)
While doing this analysis, analysts should be aware with the distinction between
probabilistic causation and probabilistic correlation. Probabilistic causation repre-
sents the occurrence of source node will effect the probability of the source node, such
as smoking is probable caused of lung cancer. Conversely, probabilistic correlation,
just, models the correlation between the occurrence of source-node and target-node.
The present of a yellow stain in a hand increases the chance of lung cancer of hand
owner, but it is ridiculous to state that a yellow stain contributes to the increase of
having lung cancer. It is because smoking is the one that increases the likelihood of
having a yellow stain and a lung cancer. To avoid this fallacies, analysts should verify
this analysis whether it fulfills the characteristics that are define in [21]. After ana-
lysts do all the modeling analysis, ones know how the stakeholders’ interests will be
fulfilled. Analysts may associate leaf-nodes with their costs, so that the reasoner will
elicit the “most” cost-effective solution to achieve the stakeholders’ interests as pro-
posed in [33]. The following modeling (i.e., event modeling) is meant to introduce any
uncertain events that may effect the fulfillment of stakeholders’ interests.
3.2 Event Modeling
In the GR framework, we adopt the WordNet4 definition for event:
• something that happens at a given place and time;
• a special set of circumstances;
• a phenomenon located at a single point in space-time;
• a consequence; i.e., a phenomenon that follows and is caused by some previous
phenomena.
The notion of threat [30] in computer security and hazardous condition in reliability
engineering [27] are slightly different with the notion of event in GR framework. Those
concepts are only defined as a potential circumstance that could cause harm or loss and
not specifying the notion of likelihood.
The GR framework characterizes events with two properties: likelihood and sever-
ity adopting from Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) [5] Likelihood is modeled as a
4http://wordnet.princeton.edu/
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property of an event which is calculated from the evidence values, whereas severity is
denoted as the sign (w) (negative/positive) of an impact relation. Essentially, an impact
relation has the same intuition with contribution relations, but it uses the likelihood (λ)
instead of SAT/DEN. By modeling severity as the sign of impact relation, it allows us to
model situations where an event impacts on more than a single construct with different
severity. For instance, in Fig. 4 the event runway incursion (E8) increases the SAT of
the event of having collision between aircraft (E3) and collision between aircraft
and others (E4) with different severity. Adopting from [9], we define a risk as an event
with a negative effect, alternatively an opportunity when it produces positive effects,
and consequently w is defined as [−1 . . . 1]. w = [−1 . . . 0) represents that the occur-
rence of source-node is a risk for the occurrence of target-node, w = (0 . . . 1] uses to
model an opportunity, and w = 0 represents the event does not deliver any impacts to
the target-node. This flexibility allows an analyst to model an event which acts as a risk
and an opportunity at the same time. It is because an analyst should realize that it is not
convenient to eliminate totally the risk, since the event introduces also advantages, so it
would better to mitigate its negative effects until an acceptable level. In this case study
(Fig. 4), we annotate the events with SAT which is obtained from EUROCONTROL
reports [14, 37]5. Essentially, those reports are resulted from the statistical analysis of
its historical data of aviation in European airspace. Therefore, we assume the DEN can
be defiend as 1− SAT (i.e., there is no ignorance X).
In this framework, an event is modeled as a states which is held on a particular
time. For stating the event mid-air collision (E1), we mean that:
E1 = (S1, tx) where S1 = mid-air collision, tx ∈ time-instance
This form distinguishes an event from a goal as a state-of-affair that an actor intends
to achieve. Suppose an actor has the goal having mid-air collision (S1). When S1 is
held at time t1 and t2, so we may argue they are the same goal and loosing the fact that
it happens twice. Differently, if we model S1 as an event then the occurrences of the
same state (S1) at different time are counted as different event. The identification of
events (called top-events) can be realized using different approaches, such as obstacle
analysis [40], anti-goal [39], hazard analysis [24], misuse case [35], abuse case [29],
or taxonomy-base risk identification [8]. After identifying top-events, analysts analyze
them using the similar steps as in the goal layer (i.e., decomposition analysis and con-
tribution analysis). Events are decomposed (i.e., AND/OR) into sub-events until reach
leaf-events. A proper leaf-event may be determined by:
• an event can not refined into distinguished/disjoin sub-events;
• its sub-events is difficult to be assessed (e.g., their likelihood are too small, lack
of historical data)
For instance, the event mid-air collision (E2) is AND-decomposed into imminent
collision-IC (E6) and ineffective collision avoidance (E7). In event layer, an event
AND-decomposition must represent the order of the occurrences of sub-events to result
the up-level event. It is because if the E7 occurs before E6 then it will not result in
5the annotation also represents the number of an event occurrence from a million hour of flight
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Figure 4: Event and Treatment Layers of ATM Scenario
E2 . For this purpose, graphically we assume the most-left sub-event is the first sub-
event that must be occurred, and the most-right sub-event is the last one. Suppose we
define E6 as (S6, t6) and E7 as (S7, t7), we should specify that t7 occurs after S6
is held (i.e., t7  S7). Consequently, the SAT of E7 is defined assuming the event
E6 has occurred; Sat(7)=2.5E − 1 /Imminent Collision. In OR-decomposition, the
sub-events should be disjoint events and no need to specify their order. The similar
mathematical models (3)-(8) is used to calculate the evidence values of an up-level
event.
Afterwards, analysts model interdependency (i.e., probabilistic causation) from an
event to other nodes (i.e., goals, tasks, resources, and events) using impact relations,
such as E1
−0.017−→ G3 or E8 +0.67−→ E3 (Fig. 4). Essentially, an impact relation adds the
evidence values (i.e., SAT and DEN) of the target-node according to the likelihood of the
event and the severity of the relation. To calculate the likelihood of an event (λ(E)), we
must decide whether an event is categorized as a risk or a opportunity. The following
formula can be used to decide the categorization of an event:∑
Ri∈impact-rels from E
wi > 0 iff E is an opportunity
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Ri is an impact relation that is originated from E . The event may have several impact
relations, if the total of severity (wi) of all impact relations (Ri) is greater than 0 then
E is categorized as an opportunity, otherwise it is a risk.
As mentioned before, the likelihood of an event (λ(E)) is calculated on the basis of
the evidence values of an event which is defined as follow:
λ(E) =
{
Sat(E), if E is an opportunity;
Sat(E) +X(E)6, otherwise.
(17)
Essentially, λ(E) calculation (17) is calculated assuming the worst condition by count-
ing the ignorance (X(E)) as the supporting evidence for an event which is judged as
a risk. The similar mathematical models, with the ones for contribution relations, are
defined in (18)-(19) to calculate the evidence values from impact relations.
qSat(Nj) =
⌈
Sat0(Nj) +
∑
i∈src
|+ wij | × λ(Ni)
⌉
(18)
qDen(Nj) =
⌈
Den0(Nj) +
∑
i∈src
|-wij | × λ(Ni)
⌉
(19)
To obtain SAT,DEN, and X , q values must be normalized using the normalization meth-
ods (14)-(16). By means of this modeling, analysts understand how events are devel-
oped until they impact to the goal layer. The model allows analysts to assess their
impacts to their goal event, and, possibly, to define the criticality of the events.
3.3 Treatment Modeling
Once the goal and event layers have been analyzed, analysts continue to identify and
analyze the countermeasures to be adopted in order to mitigate risks in the GR model.
In [2], we have defined the guidelines to identify the treatments from the structure of an
event-tree in the event layer. Essentially, treatments/countermeasures are tasks that are
meant to mitigate the risk. Therefore, they might be analyzed using (AND/OR) decom-
position and contribution relations, the same as the ones in the goal layer. Treatments
operates in two different ways: reducing the likelihood or reducing the severity of an
event. To reduce the likelihood, a countermeasure is modeled using a contribution re-
lation which introduces denial evidence to an event. For instance, the treatment Short
Term Conflict Alert (TR2) adds denial evidence for the event ineffective conflict
resolution (E11), applying rules on (12)-(13).
To reduce the impact, we introduce the alleviation relation as denoted in Fig. 2.
This relation intends to reduce the severity (w) of an impact relation; in Fig. 2 for exam-
ple, the relation between the treatment STCA warning system (TR) to the impact re-
lation between the event minima separation infringement (E) and the goal maintain
safe separation (G). This relation is not intended to reduce the likelihood of the event
E , but rather to reduce the severity of the event E (i.e., TR
y=−0.87−→ [E w=−2.3E−67−→ G])
6Based on the rule (2) Sat(E) +X( E )=1- Den(E)
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by reducing the w into a smaller value, following (20).
w =
⌊
w0 −
∑
Ri∈alleviate-rels of[E w07−→N]
yi × Sat(TRi)
⌋
(20)
w0 is the initial severity of a impact relation (E
w07−→ N). For all Ri, which are allevia-
tion relations for the impact relation. We calculate the final severity of impact relation
(w) with considering the satisfaction evidence of treatments ( TRi ) and the weight (yi)7
of the alleviation relation. Moreover, the severity (w) of an impact relation is never be
below 0, and w = 0 indicates there is no impact between the event and the goal. In our
model, we also allow for relations between the treatment layer and the goal layer. This
is useful to model situations where a countermeasure is adopted to mitigate a risk and
has also a contribution (especially negative) to the goal layer. Finally, we have already
completed our proposal introducing a quantitative model in the Tropos GR framework
using the ATM scenario. The similar analysis, as we have proposed in [3], can be done
in this model. Such analysis helps analysts to elicit requirements to be realized in the
system-to-be. The requirements has already analyzed the risk that might be introduced
and necessary countermeasures have already been incorporated. It will minimize the
likelihood of requirement revision due to an unacceptable risk.
4 Related Work
Related work lies on three major areas: requirement engineering, secure and depend-
able engineering, and risk analysis. In requirement engineering, Dardenne et al. [10]
propose KAOS, a goal-oriented requirements engineering methodology aiming at mod-
eling not only what and how aspect of requirements but also why, who, and when.
KAOS introduces also the concept of obstacles [40] and anti-goal [39] which can be
seen as boundaries in requirement analysis. An obstacle is defined as an undesirable
behavior to strategic interests of stakeholders, and an anti-goal defines a goal that be-
longs to an attacker that obstructs the fulfillment of stakeholders’ goals. Mayer et
al. [28] extend the i* conceptual framework [44] to analyze risk and security issues
during the development process of IT systems, requirement analysis in particular. The
framework models the business assets (i.e., goals) of an organization and assets of its
IT system (i.e., architecture, design decisions). Countermeasures to mitigate risks are
then selected in such a way that the risks do not affect these assets.
In the area of secure and dependable system, the most used frameworks are the
classical ones, namely Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [38], Failure Modes, Effects, and
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) [12]. In security engineering, approaches like attack
tree and threat tree [32, 20] are similar to the FTA. However, the most relevant work
for our purpose is Defect Detection and Prevention (DDP) by Feather et al. [16] has
been developed and applied in Jet Propulsion Lab of NASA. DDP consists of a three
layers model: Objectives, Risks, and Mitigation. Each objective has a weight to rep-
resent its importance, each risk has a likelihood of occurrence, while mitigation has a
cost for its accomplishment (mainly resource consumption). Severity of a risk can be
7y = [−1 . . . 0)
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represented by an impact relation between the objective and the risk. Moreover, a DDP
model specifies how to compute the level of objectives achievement and the cost of mit-
igations. This calculation allows one to evaluate the impact of taken countermeasures
and then support the decision making process.
In the area of risk analysis, uncertain events (i.e., threats and failures) are quanti-
fied with two attributes: likelihood and severity. Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) [5]
is widely used for quantitatively risk assessment, while approaches like FMECA [12]
quantify risk into qualitative values: frequent, reasonable probable, occasional, re-
mote, and extremely unlikely. Basically, events are prioritized using the notion of
“expectancy loss” which is a multiplication between the likelihood of events and its
severity. Approaches like Multi-Attribute Risk Assessment [7] can improve the risk
analysis process by considering multi-attributes. Many factors like reliable, available,
safety and confidentiality can result critical for a system and each of them has its own
risk value. This introduces the need for the analyst to find the right trade-off among
these factors. Finally, CORAS [11] is aiming at developing a framework for risk analy-
sis of security critical systems. The CORAS risk management consists of the following
steps: context identification, risk identification, risk analysis, risk evaluation, and risk
treatment.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have presented a framework to model risk in an organizational-setting
using quantitative data. This framework allows analysts to use objective data (e.g.,
historic-statistical data) or subjective data (e.g., expert judgment). In case of using
objective data, the analysts may eliminate ignorance (X = 0) in their calculation.
We have adopted our qualitative reasoning algorithms [3] to analyze risk during the
process of evaluation and selection of alternatives using quantitative data. Due to the
limitation of the pages, we will publish our complete framework and its application in
ATM scenario in terms of technical report.
Our approach has some limitations that we would like to overcome in our future
work. Particularly, the fact that we only model the time aspect of event in terms of
the order of event occurrences. We have realized that there could be the case where
an event must occur between a particular interval time. Such as, the event near-CFIT
(Controlled Flight Into Terrain) of a flight occurs when there is the event MSAW
(Minimum Safe Altitude Warning) and followed by the event change flight head-
ing occurs within 20 seconds. Besides that, this framework has not model interre-
lationships (i.e., delegation, trust) among actors/stakeholders which are essential for
a socio-technical system. Based on our current work in [4], we intend to adapt that
framework in to our qualitative analysis. Finally, the existence tool is really important
to help an analyst realizing this proposed framework.
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